What is a term sheet, and is it binding?
A term sheet is a short document, usually a few pages, setting out the headline terms on which an investor proposes to invest. It lets both sides agree the commercial deal before spending time and money on due diligence and the long-form agreements.
In India there is no single statute that defines the status of a term sheet. In practice the investment terms are treated as non-binding, while a few clauses (typically confidentiality, exclusivity and governing law) are written to bind from signing. Which clauses bind depends on the drafting and on how the parties act afterwards, so read the wording that says what is and is not binding.
Term sheet clauses to check
The table below lists the clauses that most often decide how much of the company founders keep and how much control they retain.
| Clause | What it means | What to check |
|---|---|---|
| Investment amount and valuation | How much the investor puts in and the company value the price is based on (pre-money or post-money). | Is the valuation pre-money or post-money, and is it calculated on a fully diluted basis, including the option pool? A higher headline valuation with harsher terms can leave founders worse off. |
| Type of security | Equity shares, compulsorily convertible preference shares (CCPS) or convertible instruments. | What rights attach to each class, when and how a convertible instrument converts, and whether the instrument is allowed for the type of investor. Investments from outside India carry extra pricing and reporting rules, so confirm with your CA or CS. |
| Liquidation preference | Who is paid first, and how much, when the company is sold or wound up. | Is it 1x or a higher multiple, and is it non-participating (investor chooses preference or conversion) or participating (investor takes both)? Model the payout at several sale prices. |
| Anti-dilution protection | Adjusts the investor’s conversion price if you later raise at a lower valuation. | Broad-based weighted average is the common, milder form. A full ratchet resets the price to the new low price and can hurt founders sharply. |
| Board and reserved matters | Board seats and a list of decisions that need the investor’s consent. | How long is the reserved-matters list, and does it cover day-to-day operations? Check who controls the board after the round and any thresholds attached to each matter. |
| Employee option pool (ESOP) | Shares set aside for current and future employees. | How large is the pool, and does it sit inside the pre-money valuation (diluting only existing holders) or outside it? |
| Founder vesting and lock-in | Founders’ shares earn out over time, and transfers are restricted for a period. | The vesting period, any cliff, what happens on leaving, and whether time already served is credited. |
| Transfer and exit rights | Right of first refusal (ROFR), tag-along and drag-along. | Who can sell to whom, the price and notice mechanics, and the threshold at which a drag-along can be triggered. These also decide who can force a sale. |
| Information and inspection rights | Reports and access the investor receives. | Frequency and scope of reporting, and whether it is proportionate for your stage and team size. |
| Conditions and due diligence | What must be completed before the money is invested. | The diligence scope, who bears the costs, and the conditions that must be satisfied before closing. Clean statutory records and a reconciled cap table remove the most common delays. |
| Exclusivity (no-shop) | You agree not to talk to other investors for a set period. | Keep the period short and tied to the investor’s progress. This is usually one of the clauses expressed to be binding. |
| Confidentiality, governing law and disputes | How terms are kept private and how disagreements are resolved. | Which law applies, whether disputes go to arbitration, the seat and the language. |
Pre-money and post-money valuation, with a worked example
Pre-money valuation is the value placed on the company before the new investment. Post-money valuation is the pre-money value plus the new money. The investor’s percentage is the amount invested divided by the post-money valuation.
The price per share is normally the pre-money valuation divided by the number of shares before the round, counted on the basis the term sheet specifies (often fully diluted, so options and convertibles are included). That share count is where many disagreements start, so ask for the calculation in writing.
| Item | Illustration only |
|---|---|
| Pre-money valuation | Rs 8 crore |
| Fully diluted shares before the round | 8,00,000 |
| Price per share | Rs 8 crore divided by 8,00,000 = Rs 100 |
| Amount invested | Rs 2 crore |
| New shares issued to the investor | Rs 2 crore divided by Rs 100 = 2,00,000 |
| Post-money valuation | Rs 8 crore + Rs 2 crore = Rs 10 crore |
| Fully diluted shares after the round | 10,00,000 |
| Investor’s holding | 2,00,000 out of 10,00,000 = 20 percent |
Check which figure the term sheet means
Illustration only: if the same Rs 2 crore were invested at a Rs 8 crore post-money valuation instead, the investor would hold 25 percent (2 out of 8) and the implied pre-money value would be Rs 6 crore. The words “pre-money” and “post-money” change the founders’ dilution, so confirm which one is meant and what share count sits behind it.
The option pool shuffle
Investors often ask for a new or larger employee option pool as part of the round, and for it to be created before their money comes in, so that it is counted in the pre-money share count. The effect is that the pool dilutes only the existing shareholders, and the investor’s percentage is unaffected. This is sometimes called the option pool shuffle.
The table uses the example above (Rs 8 crore pre-money, Rs 2 crore invested, founders holding all shares before the round) and a pool equal to 10 percent of the post-round fully diluted shares.
| Scenario (illustration only) | Founders | Investor | Option pool |
|---|---|---|---|
| No new pool | 80 percent | 20 percent | None |
| Pool created before the round, inside the pre-money | 70 percent | 20 percent | 10 percent |
| Pool created after the round, diluting everyone | 72 percent | 18 percent | 10 percent |
In the second row the headline pre-money is still Rs 8 crore, but Rs 1 crore of that value now belongs to the pool, so the value attributed to the founders’ shares is closer to Rs 7 crore. When comparing offers, look at this effective pre-money as well as the headline number.
- Size the pool from a hiring plan for the period until the next round, rather than accepting a round percentage.
- Count options already granted and still unallocated before agreeing a top-up.
- Ask whether any part of the top-up can sit outside the pre-money, or be added later as hiring happens.
Equity shares, CCPS and convertible instruments compared
The term sheet names the security the investor will receive. The choice affects voting, the investor’s priority on a sale, how anti-dilution can work and which rules apply, particularly for investors from outside India.
| Instrument | How it works | Points to check |
|---|---|---|
| Equity shares | Ordinary shares with voting rights in proportion to the shareholding. The investor ranks alongside founders on a sale or winding up, apart from any contractual rights agreed. | Simple to issue and understand. Preference and anti-dilution protection have to be built through contract and the articles, which is harder with equity shares than with a convertible instrument. |
| Compulsorily convertible preference shares (CCPS) | Preference shares that must convert into equity shares by a set time or event, at a conversion ratio that can be adjusted. They rank ahead of equity shares for dividend and return of capital. | Common in priced venture rounds. The conversion ratio is how anti-dilution adjustments are usually given effect. Preference shares carry limited voting rights under company law, so voting on an as-if-converted basis is usually set out in the agreements and articles. |
| Compulsorily convertible debentures (CCDs) | Debt instruments that must convert into equity shares on agreed terms. Until conversion they are debt of the company and may carry interest. | Check the conversion trigger, the conversion price or formula, any interest, and that the terms are drafted so the instrument is not treated as a deposit under company law. |
| Convertible notes | A short-form instrument that converts into shares at a later priced round, often with a discount or valuation cap. | Available only to companies that meet specific eligibility conditions under company law and, for investors from outside India, under foreign investment rules. Confirm eligibility before agreeing to one. |
| SAFE-style agreements | Agreements modelled on the simple agreement for future equity used elsewhere. | Indian company law does not recognise a standalone contract of this kind as a security, so local versions are usually issued as CCPS or another permitted convertible instrument. Read the underlying instrument, not just the summary. |
Instruments that are only optionally convertible, and terms that promise a fixed return, are treated differently for investors from outside India. Confirm the structure with your CA or CS before the term sheet is signed, because changing the instrument later usually means renegotiating the documents.
Liquidation preference: a worked example
A liquidation preference decides how sale or winding-up proceeds are shared. Term sheets usually define a “liquidation event” to include a sale of the company or most of its shares or assets, not only a formal winding up, so the clause matters on a successful exit too.
With a 1x non-participating preference, the investor receives the higher of its investment back or its percentage share of the proceeds. With a 1x participating preference, the investor first receives its investment back and then also shares in what is left according to its percentage.
The table assumes the investor put in Rs 2 crore for 20 percent, there is one class of preference, no debt, and no transaction costs or tax. Amounts are in Rs crore.
| Sale value (illustration only) | 1x non-participating: investor | 1x non-participating: other holders | 1x participating: investor | 1x participating: other holders |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1.5 | 1.5 | 0 | 1.5 | 0 |
| 5 | 2 (preference) | 3 | 2 + 0.6 = 2.6 | 2.4 |
| 10 | 2 (either option) | 8 | 2 + 1.6 = 3.6 | 6.4 |
| 50 | 10 (converts) | 40 | 2 + 9.6 = 11.6 | 38.4 |
Measured against what the other holders receive, the gap between the two types is largest at low and middle sale values, and below the preference amount the investor takes everything under either type. Participating preferences are sometimes capped at a multiple of the investment, after which the investor would rather convert. When there are several rounds, check whether each class ranks ahead of the earlier ones or equally with them, because the order of payment can matter as much as the multiple.
Anti-dilution: weighted average and full ratchet
Anti-dilution protection applies when the company later issues shares at a price below what the protected investor paid (a down round). It adjusts the investor’s conversion price downwards, so the investor receives more shares on conversion. The founders and other unprotected holders bear the extra dilution.
- Full ratchet: the conversion price drops to the new, lower price, however few shares are issued at that price.
- Broad-based weighted average: the conversion price moves part of the way towards the new price, weighted by how many new shares are issued compared with all shares outstanding on a fully diluted basis.
- Narrow-based weighted average: the same idea, but counting fewer existing shares, which gives the investor a larger adjustment than the broad-based version.
One common weighted-average formula is: new conversion price = old price × (A + B) ÷ (A + C), where A is the fully diluted shares before the new issue, B is the number of shares the new money would have bought at the old price, and C is the number of shares actually issued. Drafting varies, so read the definition in your own term sheet.
| Illustration only | Full ratchet | Broad-based weighted average |
|---|---|---|
| Earlier investment | Rs 2 crore at Rs 100 per share (2,00,000 shares on conversion) | Rs 2 crore at Rs 100 per share (2,00,000 shares on conversion) |
| Down round | Rs 1 crore raised at Rs 50 per share (2,00,000 new shares); 10,00,000 shares before it | Rs 1 crore raised at Rs 50 per share (2,00,000 new shares); 10,00,000 shares before it |
| New conversion price | Rs 50 | Rs 100 × (10,00,000 + 1,00,000) ÷ (10,00,000 + 2,00,000) = about Rs 91.67 |
| Shares the earlier investor receives on conversion | 4,00,000 | About 2,18,000 |
Points to negotiate: weighted average rather than full ratchet, a broad-based share count, and carve-outs so that issues such as employee option grants, bonus issues and conversions of existing instruments do not trigger an adjustment. With equity shares there is no conversion price to adjust, so protection may need another route, such as issuing further shares, and any such route has to fit company law and, for investors from outside India, the pricing rules that apply.
Control terms: board seats, reserved matters and information rights
Economic terms decide who gets what on an exit. Control terms decide who makes decisions until then, and they often matter more to founders day to day.
- Board seats: whether the investor appoints a nominee director or only an observer, how many seats founders keep, and whether the board composition changes in later rounds. A nominee director owes the same duties to the company as any other director.
- Quorum: whether a meeting needs the investor director to be present to be valid. If it does, ask for a fallback so that an adjourned meeting can proceed without them, so one absence cannot stop the board acting.
- Reserved matters: decisions that need the investor’s consent, at board level, at shareholder level or both. Reasonable lists usually cover changes to share capital, new classes of shares, the articles, mergers or a sale, related-party transactions, large borrowings and changing the line of business. Lists that reach into hiring, budgets within an approved plan or ordinary contracts can slow the business.
- Thresholds: whether consent rights fall away if the investor’s holding falls below a set level, and whether consent is given by a majority of investors rather than each one separately.
- Information rights: the reports the company must send, such as monthly or quarterly management accounts, the annual budget and audited financial statements, and any right to inspect records. Match the frequency to what your finance function can produce reliably.
Founder vesting and good and bad leaver terms
Investors back the founding team, so term sheets often ask founders to make some or all of their existing shares subject to vesting. Founders already own their shares, so in India this is usually done by contract: a founder who leaves early agrees to transfer unvested shares, at a nominal or agreed price, to a person the board or investors nominate. The mechanism has to fit company law limits on a company buying back its own shares.
- Vesting period and cliff: a period of three to four years, sometimes with a one-year cliff, is often proposed, but it varies. Ask for credit for the time already spent building the company.
- Good leaver: usually covers death, incapacity, or being removed without cause. A good leaver typically keeps vested shares and may be paid fair value for any shares they must transfer.
- Bad leaver: usually covers resignation within a set period, dismissal for cause, fraud or serious breach. A bad leaver may have to transfer more shares, at a lower price. Check that “cause” is defined narrowly and objectively.
- Acceleration: whether unvested shares vest early on a sale of the company, or if a founder is removed without cause after a sale.
- Non-compete: Indian courts are generally reluctant to enforce restrictions that apply after a person has left, so look at how any post-exit non-compete is drafted and what it is linked to.
Exclusivity and conditions precedent
Exclusivity (also called no-shop) stops the company from seeking or discussing investment with others for a set period after signing. It gives the investor confidence to spend on diligence, but it takes away the founders’ alternatives. Keep it short, link any extension to the investor’s progress, and check whether it ends automatically if the investor withdraws or the long-stop date passes.
Conditions precedent are the items that must be completed before the investor pays. Common examples include:
- Satisfactory financial, legal and tax due diligence.
- Board and shareholder approvals for the issue of shares and amended articles of association.
- A valuation report where the rules require one.
- Employment or service agreements with founders and key staff, and assignment to the company of intellectual property created by the founders.
- Fixing specific gaps found in diligence, such as missing filings, unsigned agreements or cap table differences.
Ask for the conditions to be specific and within the company’s control, and agree a long-stop date after which either side can walk away. Items that can sensibly be done after the money arrives can be moved to conditions subsequent, with a deadline.
How a round moves from first conversation to closing
- Preparation: a reconciled cap table, a financial model, a pitch deck and a data room with the company’s records and key contracts.
- Investor conversations: meetings, follow-up questions and early checks by the investor.
- Term sheet: the lead investor proposes terms, both sides negotiate, and the term sheet is signed. Exclusivity usually starts here.
- Due diligence: the investor and its advisors review financial, legal and tax records, and list issues to fix.
- Definitive agreements: the SSA and SHA are negotiated on the basis of the term sheet and the diligence findings.
- Corporate approvals: board and shareholder resolutions, amendments to the articles of association, and the offer of shares made under the private placement rules in company law.
- Closing: conditions precedent are confirmed as met, the investor pays, shares are allotted, the registers and share records are updated, and the company law filings and any foreign investment reporting are completed.
How long this takes varies with the size of the round, the number of investors, how ready the company’s records are and whether any investors are from outside India. Having the records in order before the term sheet is signed usually makes the diligence and closing stages shorter.
What happens after the term sheet?
- Due diligence by the investor on your financials, legal records, cap table and contracts.
- Negotiation of the definitive agreements: a share subscription agreement (SSA) and a shareholders’ agreement (SHA). See our guide to SHA and SSA drafting.
- Aligning the articles of association with the key shareholder rights, since rights that live only in a shareholders’ agreement may be harder to enforce against the company.
- Closing: a valuation report where the rules require one, the share allotment, and the related company records and filings. Investments from outside India have additional pricing and reporting requirements.
What to push back on at seed and at Series A
There is no fixed market standard, and terms depend on the investor, the sector, how competitive the round is and the company’s position. The points below are the ones founders most often raise at each stage, not a statement of what investors will accept.
At seed, documents are usually shorter and investors are often angels or early-stage funds. Founders commonly push back on:
- Liquidation preferences above 1x, or participating preferences.
- Full ratchet anti-dilution.
- A large option pool top-up placed entirely inside the pre-money.
- Long reserved-matters lists that require each small investor’s consent.
- Long exclusivity without a clear timetable.
- Wide personal warranties and indemnities from founders, rather than from the company with sensible limits.
At Series A, an institutional lead usually asks for fuller governance rights, and terms set here tend to be carried into later rounds. Points that often need attention:
- Board composition after the round, and whether founders keep a majority or an equal number of seats.
- How the new preference ranks against the seed investors’ rights, and whether earlier rights are being rewritten.
- Drag-along terms: the holding needed to trigger it, any minimum price or period before it can be used, and whether founders’ consent is needed.
- Investor exit rights such as a required sale or buy-back after a period. Rights that promise investors from outside India a fixed return may not be permitted, so these need checking.
- Founder vesting being reset on shares that have already vested under earlier arrangements.
- Caps, time limits and thresholds on warranty claims.
Mistakes founders make with term sheets
- Comparing offers on headline valuation alone and ignoring liquidation preference, anti-dilution and control terms.
- Not modelling dilution: the option pool, convertible instruments and future rounds all change who owns what.
- Accepting a long exclusivity period without any commitment from the investor on timing.
- Leaving the option pool inside the pre-money without noticing that it dilutes only the existing holders.
- Signing before the cap table, statutory records and existing agreements are reconciled, which slows due diligence.
Glossary of term sheet terms
| Term | Meaning |
|---|---|
| Pre-money valuation | The value of the company before the new investment. |
| Post-money valuation | The pre-money valuation plus the amount invested. |
| Fully diluted basis | A share count that includes issued shares, options granted and reserved, and shares that convertible instruments would convert into. |
| CCPS | Compulsorily convertible preference shares: preference shares that must convert into equity shares on agreed terms. |
| CCD | Compulsorily convertible debenture: a debt instrument that must convert into equity shares on agreed terms. |
| Liquidation preference | The investor’s right to be paid a set amount before other holders on a sale or winding up. |
| Participating preference | A preference under which the investor takes its preference amount and also shares in the remaining proceeds. |
| Anti-dilution | An adjustment to the investor’s conversion price if shares are later issued at a lower price. |
| Broad-based weighted average | An anti-dilution formula that adjusts the price according to how many new shares are issued compared with all shares on a fully diluted basis. |
| Full ratchet | An anti-dilution formula that resets the conversion price to the lowest later price. |
| Reserved matters | Decisions that need the investor’s consent, also called affirmative vote or veto rights. |
| Pre-emptive right | The right of existing investors to take part in a new issue of shares to keep their percentage. |
| ROFR | Right of first refusal: existing holders may buy shares a holder wants to sell, on the same terms, before an outsider can. |
| Tag-along | The right of a minority holder to sell on the same terms when a majority holder sells. |
| Drag-along | The right of holders above an agreed threshold to require the others to join a sale of the company. |
| Vesting and cliff | Shares or options earned over time; the cliff is the initial period before anything vests. |
| Good leaver and bad leaver | Categories that decide what a departing founder keeps and the price for shares they must give up. |
| Conditions precedent | Items that must be completed before the investor pays. |
| Long-stop date | The date after which either side can walk away if closing has not happened. |
| Nominee director | A director appointed to the board at the investor’s request. |
| SSA and SHA | The share subscription agreement records the investment; the shareholders’ agreement records the ongoing rights between shareholders. |